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I want to examine several failures among our colleagues to treat ontologies of race and
gender with the seriousness they deserve. Some philosophers approach race as though they have
the expertise to invent new scientific theories of race . Some philosophers approach gender as a
project in philosophical idealism that is unrelated to the problems of existing women, or else the y
ignore what women have in common . Such approaches block the possibility of fruitful thought
about social and political change at this time, and they do not have much to offer adult thinker s
who are concerned about the world in a practical historical sense . In this paper, I will firs t
address recent articles published in the Journal of Philosophy (JP), which unsuccessfully try to
resurrect biological notions of human race. I then present brief critiques of intersectionality an d
idealism in (so-called) French feminism. My criticism of these current approaches to race an d
gender is offered as a cautionary tale about theory in philosophy, and I conclude with a positiv e
thesis based on a universal definition of women, which could ground new political ideas an d
practice .
The Journal of Philosophy and Race *
*Earlier drafts of a paper under submission, “Philosophy of Science and the Existence o f
Biological Human Races,” from which this part of the present paper is drawn, benefitted fro m
critical comment and I am extremely grateful to :Bradford Z. Mahon, Rodney C . Roberts, Jason
Hill and Scott Pratt .
In recent articles published in The Journal of Philosophy, Michael Hardimon and Robi n
Andreasen have presented biological taxonomies of human races, while neglecting this crucia l
philosophy of science question . (Hardimon, 2003 ; Andreasen, 2005) . Is a taxonomy of hum an
biological races scientifically justified at this time? Also in JP Joshua Glasgow c riticizes “the
new biology of race,” as previously proposed elsewhere by Philip Kitcher and Andreasen ,
without asking if it is biology . (Glasgow, 2003 ; Andreasen, 2000, 1998; Kitcher, 1999) .
Hardimon, Kitcher and Andreasen simply asse rt that their biological notions of race are
compatible with science, in cases where the current data and conclusions of relevant scientists
2indicate otherwise . (Zack, 2002; Relethford, 1997 ; American Anthropological Association,
1998) . Hardimon is aware that the ordinary concept of race entered history as a racist concept
(positing a moral hierarchy of races), with links to scientific theories held in the eighteenth an d
nineteenth centuries, but he claims that it has a coherent core, which is independent of and
compatible with both a scientific concept of race and racism.(Hardimon, 2003, p.449-51) His
‘conception’ or reconstruction of our ordinary concept is this : (1) human groups have
distinguishing “visible physical features of a relevant kind” ; (2) human races are linked b y
common ancestry ; (3) racial groups originate from distinctive geographical locations, usually
continents . (Hardimon, 2003, pp . 451-2 )
These are the current scientific problems with Hardimon’s conception . The distinguishing
“visible physical features of a relevant kind” presupposes a social system of racial attribution tha t
has not always existed historically in human societies and that first originated during the moder n
period of European exploration and colonization (Zack, 2005, pp . 9-40; Zack, 1996 ) . It is not
timelessly the case, independently of history and culture, that those visible differences that count
as racial differences are, as Hardimon claims, naturally “striking .” Hardimon writes :
It is undeniable that these visible features are striking—from a human point of view. The
proof being that human beings find them striking . . . It seems to me likely that they woul d
still be striking—physically striking—in a world free of racism .(italics in text) .
(Hardimon, 2003, pp 454-455) .
The 19th century anthropometric attempts to correlate quantitative physical differences with
differences in social races, were later repudiated by biological anthropologists and shown b y
historians and scientists, such as Stephen Jay Gould, to have been biased, with some dat a
outright falsified. (Gould, 1996, Zack, 1996.) But 19th century anthropometry probabl y
contributes as much to the present ordinary concept of race---and its resultant perceptions---as i t
suggests the falseness of that concept for educated people at this time. What we find striking in
our perceptions of other human beings is not necessarily natural, unlearned, or independent o f
culture. That we find those physical traits of others that we take to be racial differences
3“striking” is an important sociological and psychological fact but it is not a justification for thos e
beliefs that are themselves causes of our finding what we understand to be racial difference s
“striking.”
Haridmon’s (2) and (3) are inter-related. Both the common ancestry link and the
geographical origins hypothesis rely on discarded scientific foundations of race . The consensu s
of biological anthropologists at this time (now frequently and conspicuously broadcast b y
popularizers of science in publications such as the New York Times . (Wade, 2005, 2002 ; Wilfred ,
2000.)) is the Out-of-Africa thesis that all modern Homo sapiens originated from the same
common ancestors in Africa, no more than 100,000 years ago .(Cavalli-Sforza, 2000 ; Blackburn,
2000.) There is evidence that this original population may not have had the characteristics o f
skin, hair and bone structure that came to be associated with Africans during the modern period ,
insofar as there is evidence that they had very fair skin hues and were hirsute .(Jablonski and
Chaplin, 2000 .) There is furthermore widespread doubt among evolutionary theorists that wha t
have come to be considered distinctive racial traits of skin, hair and bone were necessarily
adaptive to distinctive environments, because the remains of ancient people with varieties o f
distinctive racial traits have not been exclusively found on the continents with which thos e
distinctive racial traits are associated .( Zack, 2001 ; Zack, 2002, p .39; Corcos, 1997, Robins,
1991, Brace, 1965, p . 107.) Furthermore, in tracking the migration of the original African
ancestral population, non-protein coding genetic material (which has no relation to bodily traits) ,
such as mitochondrial DNA is used, so there is no empirical evidence to support the claim tha t
there is a correlation between what we now consider to be physical racial traits, or phenotypes ,
and any continental location.(Cavalli-Sforza, 2000, pp . 61-66 . )
Hardimon states that the case for “eliminativism” pertaining to our ordinary concept o f
race rests in part on the simple idea that “without race there would be no racism .”(Hardimon,
2003, p.455.) He goes on to say that racism does have a “toehold” in reality and to argue that
preservation of the core idea of race, via his conception of it, is necessary in order to addres s
racism.(Hardimon, 2003, p . 455) This is debatable once we distinguish between justified belief
4and unjustified belief. On the level of justified belief we can mention unjustified beliefs without
ourselves holding or using them. Consider religion. One does not have to believe that Jesus is he r
personal savior to talk about born-again Christians or the intolerance of homosexuality evince d
by some of them. Similarly, one does not have to believe that an ordinary concept of race tha t
depends in its core on now-falsified scientific ideas, is a justified concept, in order to talk abou t
that ordinary concept of race or about the racist beliefs and behavior of some of those who think
that the ordinary concept of race is perfectly fine .
Although Kitcher’s 1999 anthology article was not published in JP, it is cited as an
authority in all if the recent JP pieces.(Kitcher 1999) Kitcher has two sets of claims about race .
First, he believes that the geographical isolation of human populations in the past was sufficien t
to establish the existence of ancient races that were, he says (more or less) “pure .” These “pure
races” were closed breeding groups of individuals descended from ancestors of the same race .
Thus, Kitcher advances (R1) below as a necessary condition for a concept of race, with (R2 )
stipulating heredity of racial characteristics :
(R1) A racial division consists of a set of subsets of the species Homo sapiens . These
subsets are the pure races . Individuals who do not belong to any pure race are of mixe d
race .
(R2) With respect to any racial division, the pure races are closed under reproduction .
That is, the offspring of parents both of whom are of race R are also of race R. (Kitcher,
1999, pp.92-3 . )
To accommodate what is known about racial mixture among groups such as African Americans ,
Kitcher further notes, “Socially disadvantaged races may consist of a pure core together with
people any of whose ancestors belong to that core .”(Kitcher, 1999, p.93) (I haven’t time here to
comment on Kitcher’s association of social disadvantage with mixed race . )
Kitcher offers two important qualifications to this first set of claims . First, he carefully
disavows all associations between his proposed concept of race and human worth or intellectua l
abilities.(Kitcher, 1999, pp . 187-190.) And second, he accepts that in-breeding inter -
5generational groups not otherwise considered races, such as the English aristocracy, woul d
qualify as races according to his concept . (Kitcher, 1999, p .103-4 . )
In his second set of claims Kitcher proposes that his concept of biological race is usefu l
to explain high rates of intraracial breeding among descendants of races in physical proximity i n
American society. He claims that relatively low rates of intermarriage between descendants o f
different pure or relatively pure races, particularly blacks and whites in the US, may be evidenc e
of “incipient racial division .” Kitcher supports his notion of “incipient races” with what he
relates as Ernst Mayr’s “non-dimensional” notion of species :
“Populations at a given place at a given time belong to different species if they are not
exchanging genes . In exactly parallel fashion, we could recognize “non-dimensionsal”
races, groups at a particular time that are not exchanging genes at substantial rates .”
(Kitcher 1999, p . 102 . )
Kitcher’s notion of “incipient racialization” multiplies entities in unpredictable ways and doe s
not match present anthropological notions of human races or possible human races, as I will soo n
show. Kitcher is of course aware that social factors such as slavery, segregation and clas s
structures may be an important cause of what he calls “incipient racialization,” but he maintain s
that nonetheless, the results of social strictures are biological in a way that justifies a biologica l
concept of race .
Neither set of Kitcher’s claims is compatible with contemporary biology . If we begin
with the modern common sense notion of three major human races, the scientific task is to fin d
some independent evidence for this taxonomy. It is debatable that there ever were pure
genealogical groups corresponding to the three major races, which had the phenotypic trait s
associated with those races in the modern period. At best a taxonomy of pure ancient races is a
hypothesis, and Kitcher seems to begin with it as a premise . There is also the problem o f
evidence that the traits now associated with races were present in the ancestral populations o f
those groups, and implications of the two current accounts of human history, the out-of-Africa
thesis, and multiregionalism .
6As noted above, the out-of-Africa thesis holds that all modern humans originated i n
Africa. Some of their descendants left for Asia and Europe . Insofar as traits associated with
modern races may not have been present in the original African population, but may hav e
developed after migrations, and not necessarily as adaptations to geographical conditions (som e
may have been adaptively-neutral mutations) (Corcos, 1997, pp .83-88.)), at best one can
hypothesize a basis for racial purity based on time spent by an in-breeding population in a
particular place . This is not sufficient to ground the ordinary racial taxonomy that posits the thre e
main races as stable natural kinds, because it leaves vague the amount of time necessary to for m
a race. Although any amount of time spent by a group in reproductive isolation, could b e
massaged by Kitcher’s application of [what he presents as] Mayr’s dictim to justify calling tha t
group a race, or even a species, the result would be a large, indeterminate number of relatively
temporary human races . While few anthropologists doubt that there is a large, indeterminate
number of relatively temporary human populations, nothing empirical is added by calling thes e
populations “races,” and to do so would be misleading given the more essentialist connotation s
of “race” in ordinary language .
The multiregional thesis holds that Homo sapiens originated in Africa but spent at least
one million years in multiple geographical locations, and that from the beginning, the differen t
groups inter-bred. Inter-breeding as a scientific concept in this context has a far lower threshold
to establish population mixture and maintain a common specie (as well as block scientific idea s
of racial purity) than does what Kitcher would call “impurity” or inter-breeding as a socia l
concept . The multiregionalists require evidence of only one exogamous mating per generation i n
small populations—and modern human populations were small in the beginning, numbering i n
the tens of thousands . (Relethford, 1999; Wolpoff, Hawks and Caspari, 2000 .) So, again, there i s
no scientific support for Kitcher’s notion of pure ancestral populations corresponding to ordinar y
notions of race . Also, contemporary researchers believe that Homo sapiens share all but . 2
percent of their genes, and of that .2 percent, 6-15 percent, or about 1/5000 of the total number o f
human genes has been assigned to differences that line up with social racial
7designations.(Relthford, 1997, pp . 357-8; Templeton, 1998 .) (It should be noted that a common
error in reporting this information is to skip the first number of overall human variation and the n
state the variation that lines up with social race as though there were 6-15 percent variation i n
total human genes that line up with social races . )
As for Kitcher’s claim about incipient racial formation, it is unlikely that populatio n
geneticists would accept it because there is less in the present situation to support the existenc e
of pure races than there is in the historical record, and the historical record is not taken by them
to support the existence of pure races . Even on a demographic level, according to the 2000
census, 7 million Americans self-identified as multi-racial . If one adds to this the incidence of
mixed race among existing self-identified African Americans, which some sources place as hig h
as 90%, and also evidence that a significant perentage of whites have non-white ancestry, even a
non-scientific case for roughly pure races in the US is very weak (Zack, 2001) . The present
mixture in the black and white populations, and also within Hispanic, Native American an d
Asian groups, guarantees continued genetic mixture even without inter-marriage .
Andreasen’s “new biology of race” is related to Kitcher’s genealogical account, as sh e
states.(Andreasen, 2005, p .94) She explains that the term clade in systematic biology means a
monophyletic group, which is a group composed of an ancestor and all of its descendants . The
concept of clades is traditionally used for defining higher taxa and not for intraspecie divisions ,
but Andreasen simply asserts, “ Nonetheless it is possible to apply these ideas to race .”
(Andreasen, 2005, p .95 .) This begs the question of whether evolutionary scientists who have
provided the data for human evolutionary branching believe that it supports the ordinary idea s
about racial taxonomy. Indeed, Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, from whom Andreasen derives her notion
of clades, has said the following about his own data, which makes it clear that genealogy itsel f
cannot ground race :
The classification into races has proved to be a futile exercise for reasons that were
already clear to Darwin. Human races are still extremely unstable entities in the hands of
modern taxonomists, who define from 3 to 60 or more races . To some extent, this latitude
8depends on the personal preference of taxonomists, who may choose to be “lumpers” o r
“splitters .” Although there is no doubt that there is only one human species, there are
clearly no objective reasons for stopping at any particular level of taxonomic splitting . In
fact, the analysis we carry out . . .for the purposes of evolutionary study shows that th e
level at which we stop our classification is completely arbitrary .(Cavalli-Sforza,
Menozzi, and Piazza,1994, p . 19 . )
Of course these philosophers are not unique . There is a long history of attempts to defend
ideas of race with biology, in philosophy, science, phenomenology, liberation studies and mos t
recently the war on terrorism. The belief after September 11, 2001 that Saudi Arabians, Iranians ,
Afghanis, Iraqis, Palestinians, Moroccans, Jordanians, Syrians, and many others from suspec t
geographical locations could be racially identified, crept into the media unchallenged . I don’t
think that even the most wildly speculative pseudo-scientists of race and their followers hav e
hazzarded a biological foundation for this group, and I would suggest that if this group began t o
assert its rights, it would be a mistake for them to identify as a “race .” To do so would be to
commit thefallacy of ontological obligation, which appears to be based on reasoning like this :
Because both ordinary ideas of race and racism are based on an assumption that race has a
biological basis, to talk about those ideas and combat racism, it is necessary to posit a biologica l
basis . Clearly, this is a failure to distinguish between first order and second order discourse .
Second order discourse is about first order discourse, and it need not regard the claims of firs t
order discourse as true.
Idealism and Intersectionality in Feminism and New Political Direction s
Even if we could rescue the ordinary concept of race by resurrecting its biologica l
underpinnings, there are two reasons why this might not be useful politically . First, a biological
concept of race leads to objective racial identities and one can only go so far toward th e
accumulation of power and autonomy based on the subaltern status which is the default mode o f
non-white racial identities . Also, given strong white privilege on the grounds of what is falsely
believed to be biological race, even apparently neutral biological notions of race have the
9potential to reinscribe white supremacy in ways that falsely appear to be neutral vis a vis racism .
Second, it’s not clear that the great ills of our times---war, terror, social inequality and th e
increasing morbidity of our planet---could be corrected by a better concept of nonwhite race o r
races, because no matter their race, men rule on the highest levels of government in all societie s
and they rule over other men and natural environments, as well as women . Not only do men rule
but the men they rule over or contend with seem unable to repudiate those aggressiv e
constructions of masculinity on the basis of which men construct their leadership qualities an d
virtues as rulers. Women may be better able to resist those constructions of masculinity insofar
as they have been historically determined in certain ways, as precisely not having thos e
constructions, that is, as not being men . But I am here getting ahead of even this compressed
half-hour story .
If philosophers of race have been prone to the fallacy of ontological obligation, som e
second wave feminists have made a virtue of the fallacy of ontological abrogation . This has
happened through both intersectionality an d idealism .
I will address idealism first, because the problems posed by intersectionality are bette r
grounded and lead into practical issues in feminist politics . Allow me to ‘channel’ George
Berkeley: “All we know are our ideas, and we can only know our ideas . If we knew anythin g
outside of our ideas, it would have to be an idea . Therefore, existence and the reality of thing s
that exist are simply ideas .” It is a short step from this to the Lacanian foundation of much so-
called French feminism. Lacan in his revision of Freud moved everything of importance about
gender and gender relations into language and ‘the symbolic order’ . This results in a huge gap ,
both intellectually and referentially between a feminist subject that is taken to be representation s
or ideas of women, and existing women . Not only is much of that Lacanian feminism
inaccessible to the vast majority of existing women but it is unsurprisingly a discipline of text s
rather than practical life . (Zack, 2005, pp .61-120.) This is not so much a theory—praxis division
as a matter of whether real life or texts are the preferred subject for feminists .
The inequalities of gender that persist despite the gains of formal equality secured during
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the second wave of feminism are fairly obvious : continued violence against women, leverage d
exploitation of women of color on a global basis, glass ceilings and exclusions from to p
leadership positions for privileged women, a second shift in which women who work outsid e
their homes--- now the majority worldwide--- nonetheless continue to reproduce and fulfil l
traditional roles and obligations of female gender in private life . Of course women are very
different and their differences in kinds and degrees of oppression led to late 1970s criticism o f
second wave US feminists speaking for all women . At the same time, the case against biological
determinants of social gender was unraveling, on both theoretical and scientific grounds . The
result of both these anti-essentialisms was abandonment of any attempt at a universal definitio n
of women and with it, a sense of women’s commonality as a ideological basis for continue d
feminist politics as such. In the academy, the result of intersectionality or the view that multiple
oppressions of race and gender necessitate incommensurable femnisms, has been multipl e
segregations of women based on racial and ethnic identities . This separatism would not be
pernicious if the different feminisms and womenisms were equal in power and privilege, but the y
are not. The academy is still overwhelmingly white, as is the field of philosophy, despite th e
relative success of individual feminist philosophers, who are often isolated in their departments .
Although there have been biased universalisms in both philosophy and feminism, it doe s
not follow that a universalism, which both captures what women have in common and does no t
exclude their differences, need be biased . Women are those human beings who are assigned to ,
or identify with, the disjunctive category of : female birth designees, or biological mothers, o r
men’s heterosexual choices . Category FMP. To belong to FMP, it is not necessary that an
individual be either a mother or man’s heterosexual choice and she might have been born a man .
I offer FMP as an essentialist definition of women but not a substantialist one. That is, there i s
no substance, no stuff, no thing in each and every woman that makes her a member of FMP .
Why might we think this way? One need only reflect for a second on the wild west motif f
used by President Dubya at the beginning of the wars in Afganistan and Iraq, or the pride i n
weight lifting as preparation for political success evinced by Governor Arnold .(Bruk, 2004 ;
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Goldstein, 2003) The recent hyper-masculinization of high politics makes it evident that whil e
women have become androgynes in the workplace, men have become more masculine . And thi s
effectively relegates women to the status of lesser or imperfect men (once again) .
Women as members of the same historical group through assignment or identification d o
not have the same constructions of gender that male leaders do . The women’s movement in the
US has not yet developed into viable women’s political parties, but that could happen, not onl y
in this country but in all democracies. Such parties would be important because women have a t
least 50% of the vote. In Norway, since the 1970s, it has been legally required that parliament be
40% composed of women . Norwegian political elites view the interests of women as distinctiv e
on the grounds of their traditional gender . They think that women are interested in pensions ,
childcare, education and so forth, and they recognize that these interests merit serious attention i n
high politics, for the good of society as a whole .(Skjeie, 1998, 2005 )
Rule by women on the highest levels of government in all democratic countries woul d
require something like a global nonviolent revolution . More than that, in order to go beyond a
mere switching of players without change in the system, there would have to be a revaluation o f
values. It goes something like this . Much has already been made of Marxist failure to calculate
the economic value of women’s domestic labor toward the reproduction of the labor of others, a s
well as literal biological reproduction. Therefore, women could be paid for this work that is stil l
provided free to capitalist economies through their “second shifts .”(Hochsfield and Machung ,
1989.) However, if women were paid for their reproductive labor, not only would it disrupt th e
economies in which their work was unpaid before, but activities that ought not to have price s
would become commodities, activities such as mothering, elder care, and psychic support fo r
family life . Moreover, these activities are often one-to-one projects, tied to the concrete
individuality of participants . Therefore, paying women for their reproductive labor does not
solve the problem and neither would it check the ongoing violent and exploitative technologica l
projects of men and female androgynes who rule . So, what is needed is a revaluation of things
that are and should remain unpriced, in comparison to the system of priced commodities . This
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revaluation should result in a contraction or at least a limit on the exp ansion of the entire syste m
of commodification. And I suggest that feminists, as advocates for the well being women, ough t
to initiate such revaluation, with the understanding that men, children and natural beings, as wel l
as women, would benefit from it .
Returning to the issue of ontological comparison, race and gender are not symmetrical.
Ontologies of human races are more recent historical ideas than male-female taxonomies of gender,
although ontologies of gender that include intersexuals, trans-sexuals and non-sexuals are new . Within
these new ontologies of gender, women are the traditional contraries of men, although not their opposit e
and not their only contraries in the logical sense . (Zack, 2005, pp .23-40.) Taxonomies of race rely on
justification from the physical sciences, which is now lacking, while taxonomies of gender have bee n
more dependent on ordinary life, which continues to support them . This means that ontologies o f
gender are more concrete, insofar as their referents are existing individuals—the ultimate
subjects of history.
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